#### **Credit Supply to Bankrupt Consumers**

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The views presented herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Board or its staff.

#### **Research Questions**

- Do banks offer any credit to bankrupt consumers?
- If yes, how do banks structure the terms of these offers?

#### Why Important?

- Shed light on some key issues in the consumer credit market
  - A five-fold increase in the outstanding of consumer revolving credit since early 1980s (about \$900 billion in 2009)
  - A five-fold increase in personal bankruptcy filings during the same period (1.5 million in 2010)
    - 1 in 10 households has filed for bankruptcy at some point
  - Common view: Due to dramatic expansion of credit supply to risky borrowers
  - But we know little on how *credit supply* is related to credit risk
    - Largely because supply per se is often not observable (Musto (2004), Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump, and Montoriol-Garriga (2009), Han and Li (2010))
    - Good IVs are hard to come by
    - But it is important to identify credit supply changes separately from credit demand changes



#### **Key Contributions of Our Paper**

- We provide direct evidence on credit supply to bankrupt consumers, borrowers with the most conspicuous credit risk
  - Using the Mintel credit card mailing data—a unique data set combining credit supply information and consumer credit history
- Consumer bankruptcy decision
  - In theory, access to credit after bankruptcy is an important factor in bankruptcy filing decision
  - Absent in existing studies on determinants of personal bankruptcy filing decisions

#### **Conceptual Framework**

How bankruptcy influences future supply of credit can be ambiguous

- Bankruptcy flags reveal consumer-specific risk factors that are otherwise unobservable to lenders ⇒ Reduce credit supply
- Bankruptcy discharges most unsecured debt and improves the filer's balance sheet ⇒ Increase credit supply
- The law does not allow for repeated discharges within eight years ⇒ Supply may depend on time since filing
- Bankruptcy may change credit demand, to which credit supply may react

#### **Conceptual Framework—continued**

- To mitigate the cost of default risk  $\Rightarrow$  Offering low credit limits
- To raise profitability when credit limit offered is low ⇒ Fees
- Will bankrupt consumers accept such offers? ⇒ Likely yes.
  - demand for credit to smooth consumption
  - transaction convenience
  - build credit record
- In response, lenders have little incentive to sweeten offers with
  - teaser rates
  - rewards program

#### The Smoking Gun




#### **Anecdotal Previews Some of Our Key Results**

- Yes, banks offer credit to bankrupt consumers
- The offer is not a result of blanket campaign: banks seek out bankruptcy filers
- It suggests that bankrupt consumers, especially those fresh filers, may be a profitable demographic to target

#### **Data Description**

- Proprietary Mintel/Comperemedia data, a monthly cross-sectional survey on credit market mailings,
- Our sample covers offers received between August 2009 and July 2010
- About 3,000 participating consumers keep mail offers they receive in a month and forward them to the data vendor at the end of the month.
- Demographic and economic characteristics of participants are also collected
- Merged with credit history for each participant, including bankruptcy information (but not chapter of filing)

#### Credit Card Solicitation Mail Volume




#### **Summary Statistics—Demographics**

**Table 1: Demographics by Bankruptcy Filing Status** 


			Mintel			SCI	7		
		Years since last filing							
	Nonfilers	Filers	0-2 yrs	3-5 yrs	6-10 yrs	Nonfilers	Filers		
Mean age	52.5	50.4	48.0	49.9	51.6	50.1	49.2		
Mean household size	2.6	2.7	3.0	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.7		
Married (%)	60.6	52.8	63.8	52.0	48.0	59.5	54.1		
Black (%)	5.7	8.1	6.9	10.0	7.6	12.2	15.3		
High School (%)	32.3	39.6	37.5	43.8	38.2	32.0	39.1		
Some College (%)	21.7	24.4	22.3	25.4	24.5	17.7	23.4		
College (%)	37.3	22.0	25.0	19.1	22.5	36.9	23.4		
Homeowner (%)	76.0	55.7	57.5	52.0	57.7	62.5	51.4		
Number of consumers	42,675	2,377	487	657	1,233	3,982	436		

Our sample has fewer than 10% bankrupt consumers because we use credit bureau data to identify bankruptcy

# **Credit Score Distributions of Filers and Nonfilers Overlap**



### Filers' Credit Scores Improve Somewhat over Time



#### **Summary Statistics—Liabilities**

**Table 2: Liabilities Statistics by Bankruptcy Filing Status** 

				Filed	
	Nonfilers	Filers	0-2 years	3-5 years	6-10 years
Total debt (\$)	87,659	49,812	54,490	35,846	56,801
Nonmortgage debt (\$)	21,033	14,255	11,122	12,744	16,342
Revolving debt (\$)	9,951	3,586	2,096	2,933	4,541
Revolving credit limit (\$)	40,545	7,873	5,510	6,363	9,652
Number of revolving accounts	5.9	3.6	2.2	3.6	4.3
Installment debt (\$)	10,523	10,523	8,935	9,747	11,587
Income (\$)	77,616	54,053	58,385	48,293	55,473
N. of del. accounts	0.38	0.77	1.03	0.58	0.78


### **Summary Statistics—New Accounts and Inquiries**

Table 3: New Accounts Opened and Inquiries on Credit History


		All trades		Bank cards	
	Timing	Nonfilers	Filers	Nonfilers	Filers
% of consumers opened trades	previous 3 months	15.8	14.5	5.4	4.7
Avg. num. of trades opened	previous 3 months	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.1
% of consumers opened trades	previous 6 months	28.5	24.7	10.2	8.0
Avg. num. of trades opened	previous 6 months	1.4	1.5	1.1	1.1
% of consumers opened trades	previous 12 months	47.4	43.4	20.3	17.3
Avg. num. of trades opened	previous 12 months	1.8	1. 9	1.3	1.3
% of consumers opened trades	previous 24 months	70.7	70.6	40.2	42.8
Avg. num. of trades opened	previous 24 months	2.8	3.0	1.7	1.7

		Nonfilers	Filers
% of consumers w. credit inquiry	previous 6 months	28.9	38.0
Avg. num. of credit inquiry	previous 6 months	1.8	2.1


# Likelihood of getting credit card offers differs across credit score distribution




#### Spread is greater for filers but not dramatically so



# Minimum credit limit is low for filers and does not vary across credit score distribution




#### Annual fees are very common features of filers' offers




#### Filers' offers tend to be 'credit building'







### Likelihood of getting an offer does not improve over time after filing




## Recent bankruptcy filers have slightly lower minimum limits



#### Recent bankruptcy filers have slightly higher spreads



# Recent bankruptcy filers are much more likely to have an annual fee



#### **Econometric Analysis—Model Specification**

- Variables of interest ∈ { Received offer; Interest rate spread; Credit limit; Have teaser rate offer; Have annual fee; Have rewards program }
- Var. of interest
  - = F(filer, credit score, demograpics, balance sheet)
- Var. of interest
  - = F(time since filing, credit score, demographics, balance sheet)

### **Econometric Analysis—Regression Results I**

Table 5—Filers vs. Non-filers

	Dependent variables:							
Independent var.	Having offer (1)Probit	Pre- approved (%) (2) Probit	Interest spreads (3) OLS	Min. limit (4) OLS	Having intro (5) Probit	Having annual fee (6) Probit	Having rewards (7) Probi	
filer	-0.068***	-0.134***	0.773***	-472***	-0.129***	0.129***	-0.429**	
	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.097)	(68.7)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	
controlled for								
credit scores?	ves	yes	ves	yes	ves	ves	yes	
demographics?	yes	yes	yes	yes	ves	ves	yes	
balance sheets?	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
mean of dep. var.	0.40	0.47	13.8	1,636	0.70	0.26	0.78	
N .	45,052	35.825	22,518	17,591	35,838	35,838	35,838	

### **Econometric Analysis—Regression Results II**

Table 6—By Time since Filing

	Dependent variables:							
	Having offer	Pre- approved (%)	Interest spreads	Min. limit	Having intro	Having annual fee	Having rewards	
Independent var.	(1)Probit	(2) Probit	(3) OLS	(4) OLS	(5) Probit	(6) Probit	(7) Probit	
filed 0-2 years	0.037	-0.138***	1.335***	-367***	-0.031	0.283***	-0.630***	
	(0.024)	(0.047)	(0.171)	(117)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.045)	
filed 3-5 years	-0.048**	-0.187***	0.467***	-456***	-0.148***	0.166***	-0.602***	
	(0.020)	(0.042)	(0.170)	(113)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	
filed 6-9 years	-0.121***	-0.099***	0.595***	-565***	-0.184***	0.019	-0.276**	
•	(0.014)	(0.035)	(0.145)	(103)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.029)	
mean of dep. var.	0.40	0.47	13.8	1,636	0.70	0.26	0.78	
N	45,052	35.825	22,518	17.591	35,838	35,838	35,838	

#### **Extension: Hidden Costs and Shrouding**

- We explore "shrouding" of the true costs of borrowing by looking at less conspicuous terms of credit card contracts
- Gabaix and Laibson (2006): Even in a competitive market, sellers may shroud terms to consumers if they are either myopic or imperfectly informed
- Mintel collects more than 90 potential attributes of any offered contract

#### **Hidden Costs Results**

- Filers' offers tend to contain higher "hidden" costs than comparable nonfilers'
- Balance Transfers
  - Less likely to receive a promotional balance transfer period
  - Shorter teaser period conditional on receiving one
  - Higher balance transfer interest rate
  - More likely to pay a balance transfer fee
- Filers more likely to pay additional fees
  - Minimum finance charge
  - Monthly "maintenance" fee
  - · "Other" fees

#### **Summary**

- Lenders extend credit to bankrupt consumers, especially to those who filed most recently
- Lenders are more cautious in extending credit to more seasoned filers
- Credit offers to bankrupt consumers tend to have lower credit limits, higher interest rates and fees, and fewer incentives
- Filers benefit less from improving their credit scores than do nonfilers
- Offers to filers contain more "hidden" costs and fees

#### **Future Research**

- Cross-section: Is there state-level variation in offers based on bankruptcy exemptions, garnishment, house price declines, or unemployment?
- Time-series: What was the impact of the CARD Act on offers to especially risky borrowers?
- Dynamics: Competition in the market for unsecured credit