Skip to Content
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
  • About Us
  • Contact Us
  • Newsroom
  • Museum
  • Careers
  • Banking
  • Research
  • Markets
  • Publications
    • Periodicals
    • Data Releases
    • Speeches
  • Events
  • Education
  • People
  • Region
Self-enforcing Trade Agreements: Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy (REVISED May 2012)
  • Share
  • Print
    • Text Size
    • Smaller
    • Larger
WP cover
On This Page
WP 2009-17

The Bagwell and Staiger (1990) theory of cooperative trade agreements predicts new tariffs (i) increase with imports, (ii) increase with the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticities, and (iii) decrease with the variance of imports.

  • Download Entire Publication
Last Updated: 05/14/2012

Self-enforcing Trade Agreements: Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy (REVISED May 2012)

Chad Bown, Meredith Crowley

The Bagwell and Staiger (1990) theory of cooperative trade agreements predicts new tariffs (i) increase with imports, (ii) increase with the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticities, and (iii) decrease with the variance of imports. We find US import policy during 1997-2006 to be consistent with this theory. A one standard deviation increase in import growth, the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticity, and the standard deviation of import growth changes the probability that the US imposes an antidumping tariff by 35%, by 88%, and by -76%, respectively.

Subscribe Now

Register to receive email alerts when new issues are published.

Subscribe
More by this Author

Chad Bown

  • Policy Externalities: How US Antidumping Affects Japanese Exports to the EU

Meredith Crowley

  • An introduction to the WTO and GATT
  • Understanding the Evolution of Trade Deficits: Trade Elasticities of Industrialized Countries
Related Topics
  • Global Inflation
  • Banking reform in a transition economy: The case of Poland
  • Midwest Manufacturing Exports: Who Buys? What Sells?
  • The U.S. Trade Deficit: Is the Sky Really Falling?
View All

Follow Us:

FaceBook RSS Twitter YouTube
  • About Us
  • Contact Us
  • Newsroom
  • Subscribe
  • Tours
  • Careers
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 230 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604-1413, USA. Tel. (312) 322-5322
Copyright © 2012. All rights reserved. Please review our
  • Privacy Policy
  • Legal Notices