

# **Perspectives on Inflation and Productivity Growth**

**Robert J. Gordon**


**Northwestern University and NBER**

**Chicago Fed Academic Advisory Council Meeting**

**November 12, 2021**


# Headline CPI Inflation, Three Time Horizons, Jan. 2017 – Oct. 2021

Headline CPI Deflator, Monthly (Annualized), 2017-2021




# Core PCE Inflation, Three Time Horizons, Jan. 2017 – Sept. 2021

Core PCE Deflator, Monthly (Annualized), 2017-2021




# 12-Month PCE Core versus Dallas Fed Trimmed Mean CPI

Core PCE Deflator (current vs. 12 months ago) vs. Dallas Fed Trimmed Mean, 2017-2021



# Splitting Up the Headline PCE Deflator Into Its Pieces, 12-months Ending May 2021



# Aspects of the Inflation Outlook


- **Similarities to supply shock inflation of 1973-75**
  - Then: oil shock + food shock + end-of-price controls shock (July 1974)
  - Now: moderate oil + food added to supply chain disruption and chip shortages
- **Outcome for inflation depends on size of shock, duration, and demand response. The case for a more temporary outcome than 1973-75:**
  - Then: shocks raised level to a new high, temporary positive rate of change
  - Now: some shocks (supply chain, chips) cause a temporary level effect, prospect of a reversal to negative rate of change
  - Much less wage indexation
- **Reasons core PCE inflation will settle down at 3 to 3.5, not 2.0**
  - Rapid M growth combined with \$2-trillion overhang of excess saving
  - Labor shortages have already boosted wages, this will continue into 2022, 23

# **The 2020-21 Revival of Productivity Growth: Will it “Pay For” More Rapid Wage Growth?**

- **Wage growth in 2021:Q3 (quarterly change at annual rate)**
  - 6.3% for ECI, 5.0% for AHE
- **Productivity growth, annual rate**
  - Six quarters 2020:Q1 to 2021:Q2. 3.1%
  - Seven quarters 2020:Q1 to 2021:Q3. 2.0%
- **Combine wage growth of 5 percent with**
  - 3 percent productivity implies 2 percent increase in unit labor costs
  - 2 percent productivity implies 3 percent increase in unit labor costs
- **Thus outlook for inflation, whether headed back to 2 percent, back to 3 percent, or higher depends on interpretation of productivity data**


# The Importance of Fixed Weights, AHE vs. ECI for Wages and Salaries

Quarterly Annualized Change in AHE vs. ECI for wages and salaries,  
2019-2021




# Productivity Growth, Actual Weights vs. Fixed Weights, 2019:Q1- 2021:Q2

Quarterly Annualized Change in Actual vs. Fixed Weight Labor Productivity Index, 2019-2021




# U.S. Private Business Economy since 1987

Annual Labor Productivity Growth Rate and Slowdown/Speedup Amount, Total US Economy, Selected Intervals



# Goods vs. Services, 1987-2021

Annual Labor Productivity Growth Rate and Slowdown/Speedup Amount, US Goods v. Services Industries, Selected Intervals




# **Division of Service Industries: Work-at-home vs. Contact Services with Real Value Added per Hour in ( )**

<b>Work-at-home Services</b>	<b>Contact Services</b>
<b>Information (234.5)</b>	<b>Wholesale Trade (92.7)</b>
<b>Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing (208.0)</b>	<b>Arts, entertainment, and recreation (68.9)</b>
<b>Management of companies and enterprises (90.6)</b>	<b>Transportation and warehousing (49.5)</b>
<b>Professional, scientific, and technical services (83.8)</b>	<b>Retail Trade (45.8)</b>
<b>Educational services, health care, and social assistance (40.0)</b>	<b>Other services, except government (37.7)</b>
<b>Administrative and waste management services (35.0)</b>	<b>Accommodation and food services (27.1)</b>


# Divide Services Into Two Groups: Work-at-home vs. Contact

Annual Labor Productivity Growth Rate and Slowdown/Speed-up Amount,  
Goods v. Work-at-home Services v. Contact Services, Selected Intervals



# Divide Industries: Goods, Work-at-home vs. Contact Services

Average RVA, Hours, RVA/Hours Growth Rate  
Goods v. Work-at-home Services v. Contact Services, 2020-21



# Possible Explanations

- **Jump in goods productivity**
  - Excess layoffs in recession, similarities 2009-10 and 2020-21
- **Contact services, widespread labor shortages**
  - Labor shortages means productivity is mismeasured (longer waiting times, empty shelves, diminished consumer satisfaction)
- **Reasons for labor shortages**
  - Drop in female participation, due to at-home schooling, shortage of child care
  - Fear of Covid exposure in contact jobs
  - High saving from \$5 trillion of transfers, reconsidering low-wage jobs (record-high quit rate)

# More Possible Explanations

- Demand shifted from contact services to goods and at-home services, shifting productivity along with it
- Poor measurement of at-home hours: people are working more time in hours at home that used to be devoted to commuting and in-office small talk
  - Bloom-Davis evidence: 40% of commuting time now spent at work
- Relatively strong investment in 2020-21 in comparison to weak investment in 2008-10
  - Credit lending criteria were tight in 2009-10 following crisis
  - Stable investment with falling hours implies a jump in “capital deepening” contribution to productivity growth