#### Brief Remarks on the Financial System

#### Martin Eichenbaum<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Northwestern University, NBER and BMO Financial Group


FRB Chicago May 31 2024

The views expressed in this presentation do not represent the views of the BMO Financial Group.

## Local Projections: IV with controls and State-dependence

$$\begin{split} \Delta \textit{Rate}_{t+h} &= \alpha_h + \beta_{1,\tau}^h \Delta \hat{\textit{FFR}}_t + \beta_{2,\tau}^h \Delta \hat{\textit{FFR}}_t \times \textit{I}_{\textit{HighRate}} \\ &+ \textit{A}(\textit{L})_{t=0}^4 (\textit{GDP}, \textit{Prices}, \textit{C}, \textit{EBP}, \textit{YC}_{\textit{slope}}) + \textit{B}(\textit{L})_{t=1}^4 \textit{FFR}_t + \varepsilon_{t+h} \end{split}$$

Figure: Response of Deposit Expense Rate to Federal Funds Rate Change




- (a) Response with high and low rates
- (b) Difference Between high and low rates
- I=1 if average value of FF in the last 6 quarters was 4% or higher.

#### Lessons


	$\Delta D$ eposit Rate $_{t+h}$		$\Delta$ Interest Expense Rate <sub>t+h</sub>	
	ΔLow Rate	ΔHigh Rate	ΔLow Rate	ΔHigh Rate
h=0	0.14***	0.20***	0.14***	0.21***
h=1	0.30***	0.42***	0.26***	0.36***
h=2	0.30***	0.32***	0.21***	0.26**
h=3	0.21**	0.21**	0.21*	0.21**

- There's strong state dependence in  $\beta's$ .
- When rates have been low for an extended period,  $\beta$  is small.
- When rates have been high for an extended period,  $\beta$  is larger.
- What about Net Interest Margin

# Local Projections, NIM, IV, state dependence



(a) Response with high and low rates



(b) Difference Between high and low rates

## Local Projections, NIM, IV, state-dependence

	NIM		
	ΔLow Rate	ΔHigh Rate	
t+0	0.03	-0.05	
t+1	0.15**	-0.02	
t + 2	0.12*	0.04	
t + 3	0.15*	-0.10	

- We see strong state-dependence in response of NIM to a change in FF.
- When rates have been low for an extended period, NIM rises by a lot.
- When rates have been high for an extended period, NIM declines moderately.

#### Previous results consistent with Dreschler et. al.

Panel A: All banks

	All banks			
Deposit Franchise Value	Dec 2021	Feb 2023	Feb 2024	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
$DF_I$ (Insured)	-1.06	7.95	5.44	
	(2.37)	(3.33)	(2.99)	
DF <sub>U</sub> (Uninsured)	0.80	3.94	2.19	
	(1.64)	(2.35)	(1.73)	
$DF_I + DF_U$	-0.26	11.89	7.64	
	(3.77)	(3.99)	(4.08)	
Obs.	717	715	690	

FF, 10 year yield

Dec 2021: 0.08%, 1.52%. Feb 2023: 4.58%, 3.92%, Feb 2024, 5.33%, 4.25%


 How much of decline in value of deposit franchise between second, third period was due to rise in FF as opposed to SVB run?

## A puzzle and a danger

#### **Global Private Debt Assets Under Management**

Billions of Dollars





the fund is looking to invest its capital.

## **Dangers**

- Rise in corporate leverage and default
- Ory Powder and deterioration in credit quality
- Openation of the property of the state of
- there's a lack of transparency